Turkey's Place in the new architecture of Europe

Yayin Tarihi:23 Mart/March 1998

TURKEY'S PLACE IN THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE
An Updated Assessment

By
Mehmet OGUTCU
Jean Monnet Fellow

October 1992 Bruges & Paris

Continued from part IV - published on March 23 1998

(item e) Factors Affecting the Turco-Community Relations

At the beginning of the 20th century, Islam - colonized, defeated, stagnant - could easily have been written off from history and the future. At the dawn of the 21th century, Islam - resurgent, confident, 'militant', 'fundamentalist', very much alive - is, however, poised to become a global force to be reckoned with. Whether it is seen as a force for liberation or as an authoritarian step back to the Middle Ages, it is beyond any doubt that Islam cannot be ignored. From the outside, that is from the perspective of the West, only a certain variety - the most overt, vocal and aggressive - of the whole diverse array of Islamic revivalism appears to be visible. To establish an ideological Islamic state has been the fundamental goal of all contemporary Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan and Jamaat-e Islami in Pakistan. All experiments in the establishment of a romantic Islamic state have turned out to be theocratic (Iran) or totalitarian (Pakistan, Sudan) regimes.

The struggle for power in Algeria has been, after Iran, another forceful reminder to Europeans that they are surrounded by the 'Islamic Crescent', a crescent that extends from the former Ottoman Empire and the soft underbelly of the former Soviet Union, from the Maghreb in the west to Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines in the east and down south into the heart of Africa. According to a UN report, there will be 1.27 billion Muslims by the turn of this century, or nearly a quarter of the world's population. The vitality of Islam far outweighs, in theory and in practice, the historic experiment of Leninism and socialism in the Third World. It is an active world religion that sees man, society and politics as indivisible. Europe, not only encircled by Muslim neighbours, also hosts millions of Muslim immigrant population. Muslims constitute three to five percent of the total populace in Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Over the past few years, as the economic hardships started to bite, attacks by racist, fundamentalist groups on Muslim immigrants in Europe have steeply risen across the Continent. A xenophobic upsurge has delivered new support for the far right. In Italy, anti-immigrant 'Lombard League' is gaining strength. In Belgium's general elections last November, the anti-immigrant 'Flemish Block' won a quarter of the votes in Antwerpen. In France nearly a third of respondents told opinion-pollsters that they agree with the leader of the 'National Front', Jean-Marie Le Pen, on immigration issues. The latest election victory of the extreme right-wing parties in Germany has been seen as a political earthquake. Continued violence against foreigners and hostels for asylum applicants is casting an increasingly dark shadow on the picture Germany presents to the world.

There are another two emergent Muslim-populated countries in the heart of Europe. After 23 years of brutal Stalinist suppression, Albania's communist rulers had failed in their policy to eradicate Islam. A newly elected democratic government is currently in place in Albania, where an estimated 80 % are Muslims. The painful emergence of a new Muslim Republic in Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, has changed the delicate balances in Europe and particularly in the Balkans. The European leaders seem to be uneasy about the creation of a Muslim state in Bosnia, but had to recognize it early April after long bargaining on the constitutional arrangements (while deferring its decision on Macedonia to a later date). All this is to say that Islam is a powerful force both inside and outside the European Community. It is therefore very important that a more enlightened, more pragmatic, more holistic, more broad-based and secular-oriented Islam should emerge and "crumble the fundamentalist stance under its weight". But the main problem here is that most Europeans tend to associate almost all Islamic countries with the Iranian-style militant Islamic fundamentalism and view Islam generally as a major threat targeting at the very foundations of the Western civilization. This is a grave mistake. The implications of this need to be considered very carefully. If the price to be paid is to make every Muslim resident in the Community feel that (s)he is at best a tolerated alien and every neighbouring Muslim state feel that it is looked on by Europe as an enemy, then that price, needless to say, is too high. Europe should learn how sensitively to handle its relations with the Islamic world, abandon its religious-oriented and "narrow-minded expectations" and accept that it faces a new challenge, a challenge more than power, than any it has faced this century because it is fundamentally a challenge of spirit. Vilification by the West of Islam asserting that this religion is synonymous with backwardness and authoritarian regimes serves no purpose, but only deepens the mutual mistrust.

Before or if such a cleavage outbreaks, Turkey as the "model of a Western state, which combines modern capitalism and secular democracy with a moderate brand of Islam", could find a credible role for itself as a bridge between the two communities. A recent survey of Turkey in the Economist gives the most likely outlook for the world of the next 15 to 20 years: "The Russian danger has gone away, until and unless Russia reassembles the economic strength. There will be economic friction, and bad temper, between the winners of the Cold War, America, Europe and Japan. Eastern Asia contains both the last remnants of defeated Marxism and the world's most efficient examples of victorious capitalism, but no great crisis between them is in prospect: eastern Asia's ideological wars were won and lost a generation ago. Only a nuclear North Korea might make that untrue. Southern Asia may have to live through an attempt by India to become the local superpower, but the new world order (and India's own internal disorder) can probably contain that. Latin America and Africa at last have chance to concentrate on their enormous private business." That leaves, according to the survey, only one large stretch of the world notably liable to produce turmoil: the crescent-shaped piece of territory that starts in the steppes of Kazakhstan and curves south and west through the Gulf and Suez to the north coast of Africa. This western part of Islam is a potential zone of turbulence for a depressing variety of reasons. With one admirable exception - not counting non-Muslim Israel - the area does not yet have a single working democracy. "This economically unhappy, politically prickly stretch of the world sits next door to a Europe that has a chance, for the first time in its life, to be democratic all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals. Europe and Islam have had a difficult time with each other over the past 1300 years. The fear and hatred are still there", it concludes.

Turkey's chief value is to be an example to the region around it - a living demonstration of the proposition that a Muslim country can become a prosperous democracy, a full member of the modern world. One has to admit, however, that there is a certain degree of anxiety about a Muslim state joining the EC because of the above mentioned misconceptions about Turkey and Islam. Due to the continued Middle East crisis, there has been a tendency, right or wrong, to associate the growth of terror during the past twenty years with groups which happen to come from the Islamic world - Iran, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. So there is a very crude mixing of these factors together in the minds of Europeans. What is important to add here is that Europeans in general do not realize that Turkey is a secular state in which religion remains excluded from state affairs, although 95 % of its population is Muslim; and that Turkey does not share the views and behaviour of all of its neighbours. On the contrary, it considers the spread of the Islamic fundamentalism as a great threat to its own security and strives, to the best of its ability, to curb its growth in the region. To dispel any doubts about its credentials, Turkey needs to project its secular and modern image more forcefully because prejudices and misperceptions are deeply rooted in Europe. People's perceptions of one another take quite a long time to change. Turkey should, as a first step, build up a network of fairly knowledgeable, sympathetic constituency in the Community member countries, which it currently lacks. A Turkey firmly anchored in the European Community would most tellingly disprove the stereotype notions that "there is an inherent incompatibility between Islam and values such as democracy, modernity, secularism and free market economy" and confirm that the EC is not based on religious conceptions, but is a community of secular nations. It would, in the final analysis, constitute a concrete case for demonstrating that the Western ideals and values are universal.

f) New Opportunities in the Central Asian & Caucasian Turkish Republics and the Balkans.

Once one of the world's great imperial powers, Turkey - like Britain and France - has never lost its conviction that it has a special role to play in international affairs. Yet, in spite of its strategic position at the hinge of Europe and Asia, these ambitions have been frustrated since the final collapse in 1923 of the Ottoman Empire, by Turkey's nascent economic development, its political instability including three military interventions in the last 30 years and the restraints imposed on its freedom of action by the military might of its former Soviet neighbour. The end of the Cold War era has resulted in Turkey becoming a major regional power to benefit most from the break-up of the ex-Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Between 1945 and 1991, Moscow was the predominant power in the Balkans to the west of Turkey and in the Caucasia and Central Asia to the east. Today there is a truly power vacuum in these areas, in which Turkey is best positioned to play a leading role. Post-Cold War hopes for peaceful coexistence across the world mean Turkey's active economic, political and military participation in this new era. Turkey will be called upon to participate in new forms of multi-dimensional cooperation involving the Western Europe, the new democracies of the Central & Eastern Europe, the independent republics emerging from the old Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and, finally, some nations of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. With its pluralistic democracy, secular state and a free market economy, Turkey is not only a model for those countries, but with all its historic experience, is also a moderating & stabilising factor in the region. Such a role would have been unthinkable even five years ago. Its unique assets hence make Turkey one of the leading countries in laying the foundations for economic, political and security interdependence in this vast region extending from the 'Adriatic coasts to the Chinese border' in the Far East. Turkey, while lacking contiguous borders with the predominantly Turkish Republics of the Central Asia, feels deeply the developments in these new countries.

Turkey's role in the Trans-Caucasia, the Central Asia and, to a certain extent, the Balkan peninsula, may be compared to the geo-strategic equivalent of Germany's attraction for most of the old Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. Turkey matters so much in those regions - as Germany does in Europe. Under the headline The Sick Man Recovers, the Times editorial depicts Turkey in the following words: "No sooner has Germany begun to stretch its muscles across Central Europe than another historical ghost is emerging to the south. Turkey not only boasts a vigorous growth rate; it is now actively intervening in the economies of its sickly neighbours". Turkey is already the largest single source of foreign investment in both Bulgaria and Romania. From Brussels, the Times notes, "Turkey is still a developing country, well behind the economic and political development of the EC. But seen from Bucharest or Taskent, it is a dynamic regional power. They see in Turkey's well-stocked shops, thriving agriculture and developing infrastructure a new Germany to pull them out of stagnation. Turkey's role in promoting regional stability where the West has little influence or experience could be invaluable". There is a widely held view in Brussels that the EC should explore ways and means of contributing to the process which Turkey started in respect of setting a Western-style model to the newly emerging democracies. Through Turkey, the influence of the Community could be extended up to the steppes of Central Asia, which is to bridge Europe with the Far East and the Pacific region. The West needs to begin thinking of greater Central Asia as a new and potentially active part of the world politics, one that will begin to establish a new presence in the Asian, the Middle Eastern and the Eurasian politics. It is in the EC's own self-interest to support a secure, peaceful and Western-oriented development of the Eurasian world. For a wide range of reasons, which are subject of another study, the EC interests will be best served by engaging in this vast, extremely diverse, but surprisingly little known region through a close and constructive partnership with Turkey. However, the internal dynamics of the EC's foreign policy-making and various constraints - financial, conflicting member state interests, competition with other policy areas and geographical priorities - may hinder the development of an effective Community policy towards this region. As Mr. Mark Eyskens, the former Belgian Foreign Minister, once remarked, the EC is currently an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. This judgement was confirmed by the EC's failure to deal with the on-going crisis in ex-Yugoslavia - a European state on its doorsteps. Before it could play any significant role in determining the course of events in Eurasia and beyond, there would have to be a major restructuring and redistribution of power within the EC and that, for the time being at least, would be strongly resisted both at home and abroad. In an overall evaluation, if the EC is ever going to play a role of global power, this region remains to be the first testing ground.

On the other hand, the emergence of a kind of crescent of Islamic states in the southern parts of the former Soviet Union - the Central Asian & Caucasian Turkish republics, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey - may understandably cause a sort of European apprehension that with Turkey as a full member of the EC, it could involve the Community in Central Asian and Islamic problems & uncertainties. This, however, represents a narrowly-focused approach. If Europe declines to take on global responsibility in that vast part of the world, the vacuum will be filled by anti-Western powers. The choice is to be there or not. The Konsomolskaya Pravda writes that the acceptance of a 'Turkey model' for the Central Asian republics would be looked upon positively by the Slavic republics as well. The article stresses the view that Iran, as a fundamentalist Muslim state, is also trying to increase its influence in the region and concludes that Turkey's influence is the 'best of all choices' and that Iran's, based on radical Islam, would be a negative factor not only for the Slav republics, but also for the balance of power in Europe. Although Turkish leaders carefully note that Ankara is not in competition with any other country for a regional leadership role, it is clear that Turkey remains the only country capable of curbing the growth of an Iranian-style Islamic radical movement in this region. The Turkish Republic exerts every effort to restore the links, long since broken, with their Turkish brethren to the east and to share with them the Turkish vision for the future. A host of other players, too, with competing aims and agendas are plunging into a replay of the "Great Game". Some regional neighbours - India and Pakistan among them - see opportunities for trade and commerce in the liberated republics of Central Asia. China borders on three of the Turkic Republics and seeks to extend its influence there as a counter-weight to Russia. Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan would like to build Islamic republics on both sides of the border. Syria and Libya have already opened consulates there. Saudi Arabia is engaged in a fierce rivalry with Iran to establish its own version of Islamic fundamentalism in the area. Even Israel has won noteworthy initial success in cultivating good relations with these republics through technical and agricultural aid of various kinds. The big powers, the US, the EC, Japan and Russia, are politically hanging back at this stage of the game, while their firms are actively exploring economic potentialities. Russia, because of its current internal problems, is at least for a while out of the game. But we have no doubt that Moscow will be back - a country with the size, the numbers, the resources, the talents, the experience, the ambitions of Russia will not stay out definitely. There will ba a hard time, which may last well into the 21st century, but sooner or later Russia - under whatever kind of regime - will be back as a major player in the international game.

In the 1970s and 80s many Western analysts looked to Islam as the force that would undermine communist rule. There was constant talk of the Soviet Union's soft Muslim underbelly. Now Islam, notably Islamic fundamentalism, is viewed as replacing communism in the front. For 40 years communism was the perfect ideological opponent of the West. But now that communism has been exorcised, who is to play the role of the 'devil'? Ian Mather argues that Islam fits the bill to some extent. This, too, looks like an oversimplification. It is particularly wrong to present the current Islamic revival as a global ideology that, like communism, is competing with democracy, has to be struggled against. Islamic radicalism is not, as it is often portrayed, a plague threatening to infect whole populations; it is a disturbing, but limited, response to national or personal humiliation inflicted by incompetent or careless rulers. It flourishes in places where no opposition is allowed; it also flourishes on martyrdom. If the political systems were opened up, the militant Islamic opponents in the Moslem world might lose much of their appeal. As for the Central Asian Republics, most people in these countries seem willing to 'give the market economy and political democracy a chance'. They are aware that talk about an Islamic state will scare off Western investors and push them out of the international system at a time when the Western assistance is of paramount importance for tackling the severe problems inherited from the Soviet past. The danger of religious revival, predicts Steele, is to rise in a decade or two, just as it did a generation after independence in Algeria and Egypt and 25 years after the Shah started his modernisation effort in Iran. If economic and social problems are not effectively tackled, only then will the Islamists have a real chance. Eliminating the vestiges of a totally different regime and frame of mind in these fragile democracies will undoubtedly require time and perseverance. Therefore, transition period for the newly emerged states towards democracy and free market may last longer than expected.

The sheer size of great expectations pinned on Ankara by these republics simply exceeds Turkey's capabilities. It cannot alone cope with the economic and political challenges there. It certainly requires a joint Western effort. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin, told in a CNN interview on 7 March 1992 during his official visit to Central Asian Republics that the EC, the US, Japan and Turkey should enter this region together so as to ensure a peaceful transformation in those young, inexperienced members of the international community. During a recent tour of the region, the prime minister, Mr. Demirel has extended to them some $ 1 bn worth of loans and export credits. Ankara also offered help to modernize the Central Asian states' telecommunications and transport networks. An ambitious Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) has been set up to coordinate every kind of assistance, investment or project designed to support the "newly-independent Turkish-speaking and neighbouring republics". In nine months, nine Turkish Embassies have been opened in CIS countries. Turkish leaders are aware that Turkey's own contribution can be no more than a drop in the ocean compared with the total Western financial aid required by the region and that the problem is further complicated by the priority that has been given by Western donor countries to aid for other "politically more important", European parts of the former USSR. After visiting Uzbekistan and Kazakhistan as well as Belarus and Ukraine late February 1992, the EC's External Affairs Commissioner, Mr. Frans Andriessen, said the EC should show the world a lead in stabilising the longer term economic future of the CIS and that Brussels should not be seen to demote the Central Asian republics to second place, behind European CIS republics, but should negotiate trade and cooperation deals with all of them. The EC Council founded the TACIS programme, the equivalent of PHARE for the ex-USSR countries in December 1990 in order to "support the ongoing process of economic reform and development in the 11 states of the CIS and Georgia". The TACIS is the main EC funded technical assistance programme, whose function and structure is similar to that of PHARE. In 1991 TACIS disposed of a budget of ECU 400 mn and the 1992 programme is based on individual projects prepared for each of the newly independent states, which would reflect their specific economic reform priorities and objectives. By September 1992, ECU 205 mn had been signed or sent out for tender under the TACIS programme. For the Community, which has limited influence over the region, it would evidently be preferable to see these republics being nurtured by Turkey, than by an Iran in which fundamentalist mullahs still exert a powerful influence. The US and Japan have also expressed interest in launching joint projects involving Turkey in these republics. The NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Worner, too, in a recent Brugge lecture, underlined a similar approach, stressing that an equal treatment of all the former Soviet republics is essential in order to ensure a Western influence in these countries.

The Central Asians' economic prospects also vary widely. For instance, Turkmenistan is sitting on gas reserves larger than Algeria's and now that it no longer has its profits taken away by Moscow, its tiny population could become as rich as any Gulf state. Natural resources are plentiful in these republics. Azerbaijan is one of the major oil producers. So is Kazakhistan. The world's biggest cotton fields lay in Uzbekistan. Czarist Russia and the ex-Soviet Union absorbed Central Asia gradually, from the mid-1800's until the 1920's, and built a colonial-style economy. They developed agriculture - including massive wheat and cotton belts - and intensive mining. But Central Asia can process few of these resources, trading raw or semi-finished commodities at low prices to the Slavic dominated republics in exchange for more expensive finished goods. Central Asian republics are eager to end their decades of Soviet-imposed isolation, expressing confidence that access for their commodities to world markets will offer a base for intensive economic development. Western companies are more distant and unused to business methods there.
The West has remained aloof, investing only $ 300 mn in the former Soviet Union in 1990 - a minuscule total in comparison with about $ 2 bn invested in Hungary. Of 1500 foreign- Soviet joint ventures established in 1990, more than 1000 were in Russia and only 25 in Central Asia according to a study by the World Bank. Turkey feels it has a headstart in these republics, especially in the Turkish-speaking ones, as a trade conduit for Western companies and a political and diplomatic counterweight to Iran. Turkey is well placed to arrange off-take deals, using the republics' natural resources as collateral for trade financing, similar to the Soviet gas pipeline deal. Commodity trading may provide Turkey with some business, although over the longer term, with the shortage of foreign exchange, Turkish traders will have to look at barter deals. The target for the year 2000 is $ 12 bn a year. Clearly, finance will remain the main obstacle, at a time of mounting budget problems at home.

Meanwhile, Ankara is at the same time exploring vast Balkan, Russian and Ukrainian markets as well - through the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone. The idea of a 'Black Sea Economic Co-operation Region'(BSECZ) is a new form of multilateral co- operation. This project, pioneered by Turkey, is certainly connected with the profound changes in Europe in the past few years. Economic progress is the main concern for all the Black Sea littoral countries. They share many convergent interests, based on their neighbourliness, complementary economies and their extended bilateral relations. The project is neither presented as an alternative to the EC, nor is it believed that it will become an impediment to EC membership for its individual member states. The Co-operation project has been guided, according to Turkish strategists, by the three main considerations of (1) how to achieve the integration of this region into the world economy; (2) how to turn to best use the advantages accruing from the geographical proximity of and the traditional ties between the Black Sea countries both with respect to one another and vis-a-vis third countries in Asia, the Middle East and Central Europe; and (3) how to develop a model of multilateral economic co-operation and trade liberalization that can ensure a smooth and effective transition to a market economy. The project brings some 316 mn people together of Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria and Moldava. Besides the littoral countries, Albania and Greece also joined this project when the heads of government and state had met in a historic summit in Istanbul on 25 June 1992 to sign the final document. It is hoped that the economic power which will be resulting from the project will also facilitate political cooperation and mitigate the effects of extreme nationalism, helping member countries overcome political tensions and promoting closer political cooperation as it increases the presence of each member in the other's trade & investment matters. By creating greater vested interests among the member states, it is thought by those who pursue political motives to raise the political profile and awareness of members' political and economic sensitivities. It would also help foster a more stable and predictable trading & economic environment for the partner countries to allow for greater specialization and to encourage rationalization of the industrial structure within the region, which would be to the benefit of each member and the region as a whole. It could also act as a stepping stone to freer future trade as it will provide member states with a structural adjustment mechanism which could later on make the political decision to pursue multilaterism easier to achive. On a negative note, it might reduce the political and economic desire to seek and offer further access to world markets, resulting in the balkanization of world trade into regional blocs. The agreement envisages at a later stage the free movement of people, goods, services and capital as well as enhanced inter-governmental cooperation. A permanent secretariat will soon be set up in Istanbul. A distinguishing feature of this agreement is the prominent and active role assigned to the businessmen of the region who would determine the terms of cooperation. Within a broader perspective, this project could combine the three hinterlands of the region: the Balkans through Ukraine and Turkey; the Central Asia through Caucasia and the Eastern Mediterranean through Turkey.

On another front, in Tehran, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan met on 5-6 February 1992 to inject fresh blood to the 27 year-old Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), welcoming Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as new members and Kazakhistan as observer. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), the ECO's precursor, had become moribund following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The three founding member states with a combined population of 220 mn, close historical ties and a foreign trade turnover of nearly $ 100 mn, had vast scope for cooperation, which could bring a sea change in the economies of the three countries if the cooperation could lead to the retention of even % 10 of that turnover within the region. The RCD was reactivated in 1985 under the name ECO. The February 1992 meeting had also witnessed the signing of a protocol relating to a preferential customs tariff between the member states. The protocol envisages a % 10 reduction in customs duties for various customer goods, chemicals and the like. It was also stressed that efforts would continue for the lifting of all obstacles with regard to tariffs and state subsidies for exports. During the recent visits late October by the Turkish prime minister to Islamabad and Teheran, it was decided that the ECO would be the real "dinamo" of the intense economic cooperation incorporating Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. This should be seen in the context of Turkey's other regional economic co-operation initiatives - not as an Islamic Common Market as speculated by some commentators. Iran also launched, following on the footsteps of Turkey, a Caspian Sea Co-operation Area grouping together the littoral states of the Caspian Sea.

Turkey's active involvement in the former Soviet states could be a good thing or a bad thing, depending on from which perspective one views it. The good possibility is that Turkey will help to lead these places, too, towards a free-market, democratic and secular future. The danger is that, for some Turks, the reappearance of this Turkish family to the east opens up an alternative to the west-looking policy of the past 70 years. The fears are spelled out that the family, instead of being pulled by Turkey into new ways, may pull Turkey back into old ones. Arguing that the future merging of Eastern and Central Europe into the West European system may complicate, or even defeat, Turkish aspirations to join the Community, a Belgian MEP asked "might not Turkey find important compensation in economic and political influence in Turkish Central Asia and Caucasia?". This question has been voiced by a number of Europeanists who prefer to hold Turkey at arm's length. For 70 years, the iron curtain separated Turkey, as it separated Germany, from the cousins to the east. The argument goes that there was nowhere to look but westward. Now the iron curtain has gone; the family can meet again. The author believes that it would be an exaggeration to call this 'family re-union' danger as talk in Turkey of pan-Turanism, a Turkish Commonwealth, is still confined to the wilder shores of right-wing romanticism. Turkish nationalism, as enunciated by Kemal Ataturk, had been focussed on the present-day Turkish territory, whose frontiers drawn by the 1921 National Pact and had never adopted claims to historic Turkish territory further east. It will be as big a pity for Europe and the USA as for Turkey itself if it gets diverted from the course it set itself 70 years ago. This is highly unlikely given Ankara's strong Western vocation since early 1920s.

Talking of Turkey's regional role, one should also make some mention of its Balkan dimension. The Balkans has, throughout the history, been the opening window of the Turks to Europe. They have been deeply rooted in the Balkans for more than 700 years. Although no parallelism exists, there are important similarities between the events that have taken place in what was the Soviet Union and the ex-Yugoslavia except that the process of disintegration in the Soviet Union ran smoothly without, to a great extent, bloodshed. But in the former Yugoslavia demands for independence caused enormous tension and resulted eventually in a bloody civil war which still takes its high toll. Turkey has not hurried to recognize the republics breaking away from Yugoslavia until it became firmly convinced that the political and geographical map of Yugoslavia has been irreversibly redrawn. Ankara has recognized all the former Yugoslav republics, arguing that being selective would add to the instability in the Balkans. The Bosnian crisis has put the Turkish leadership in the center of diplomatic efforts to find an early solution. The Turkish government has called for a military intervention by a UN-mandated force, which could be provided by NATO in order to "make the peace" in this case and not "keep the peace" as has been the case for previous UN forces. Ankara announced that if necessary Turkish troops could be sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina if the world decided to act and intervene in the fighting to stop the bloodshed. As matters stand, there is very little chance at this stage for such an intervention given that the countries who could lead such a venture - the US and the EC - have no real motivation in doing so. The best that Turkey can in fact hope to do at the present time is to act as the conscience of the world and keep the question of finding a just solution to the plight of the Bosnians alive in every international platform that she is in. The disaster in Bosnia is indeed a serious blow to what Turkey stands for in the world. The chief victims of the crisis are of Bosnian Muslims - 45 percent of the population, but presently left with barely 5 percent of the land. From other Islamic nations come a growing protest that Europe does not care what happens to Muslims, while hurrying to the help of Christians. That complicates Turkey's attempt to orient other Muslim countries towards a modern, democratic, friendly-to-West future. It seems that after hundreds of thousands of Iranian, Afghan, Bulgarian Turk and Iraqi refugees, Turkey is now about to face a serious influx of Bosnian refugees, specially given the fact that something like 5 percent of Turkey's 60 mn people are of Bosnian descent, who will no doubt press for more support to their kinsmen.

The traditionally tense relations between Bulgaria and Turkey are now relaxed and the two countries have concluded a network of treaties calling for economic, political and security co-operation. As a consequence of military dialogue, Ankara has decided to cut back significantly the number of the Turkish troops deployed in Thracian region along the Bulgarian border. Turkey has also concluded similar agreements with Albania and Romania. The Romanian Foreign Minister told the author during his Bruges lecture last March that the relations between Ankara and Bucharest are currently in an "excellent" state.
Turkey has been one of the few countries in Europe, which maintained good economic and political relationship with Albania during its isolationism, while at the same time supporting the rise of a democracy movement there. The conditions in general are now perceived as quite favourable for Turkey to enhance its economic and political presence in the Balkans. The emergence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (with considerable Moslem and Turkish populations) in international scene as independent states provides the Turkish diplomacy the possibility to form a new Balkan policy. Kohen, a senior diplomatic columnist, writes that the historical, cultural, religious and ethnical ties with the peoples in these two republics will create an atmosphere conducive not only to better bilateral relations with these countries, but also set up new balances in the region. By following a sensible and cautious policy and taking due account of the sensitivities of the peninsula, Turkey is destined to play a more influential role in the new equations of the region. And Turkey's eventual integration with Europe will largely depend upon its integration with this historic basin of the Balkans in the next decade, which constitute a geographical whole for link with other EC countries. So they took the lead of launching the Black Sea regional integration project. The Turks are also conscious that they have to act prudently in their relations with the newly independent Turkish republics and the Balkan states, avoiding any impression that they may be patronizing these young states as the 'big brother' or that they act as 'an agent of the Western imperialism' - an image that Iran is trying to portray.

Greece follows these developments with growing uneasiness because Turkey, in a vast area stretching from the Adriatic coasts to the Chinese border, has now the chance to thread a new network of relations, the progress of which Athens is unable to influence as it does in the European context. The crisis in the Balkans, generally speaking, caught all major Greek politicians unprepared. Greek politicians saw themselves mostly as players on a predominantly European stage, belittling the 'petty' Balkan issues. But the Balkan dimension of Greece's foreign policy is now likely to dominate politics in the immediate future. Beside the economic implications of the crisis (60 percent of Greek exports to Europe pass through the Yugoslav motorways), Greece has been alarmed by the reopening of the Macedonian question on its northern borders. As Ozdalga suggests, Ankara and Athens have to settle their differences and resume mutually beneficial co-operation in bilateral relations as well as in the context of the EC and the Balkan politics. The uncertain post-Cold War environment dictates a rapid rapprochement between Ankara and Athens, particularly in the Balkans and the EC context because a blind zero-sum game between them means losses on both sides.

g) The Concerns of the Community Institutions.

Many critics of the new enlargement have stressed its likely impact on Community institutions and argued that, unless radical changes took place before any new members were admitted, the Community decision-making mechanism might slowly grind to a halt. Fears about the ability of the institutions to survive yet another round of enlargements have been expressed by most member states and Commission officials. The experience with Greece, which has paralysed the workings of the Community at times, compels the EC institutions to take an even more cautious and reluctant position vis-a-vis Turkey - a country, which is several times bigger than Greece. Turkey would expect to enjoy representation in the Community institutions equal to that of the big four - Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. If present rules remain still in force, this will mean two Commissioners, 81 Euro-MPs in the parliament, one judge in the Court of Justice, a Vice-President in the European Investment Banks and so on. The Turkish accession would also in the long term raise another issue. Amongst the member states of the enlarged EC, Turkey would be unique in having a population growing by over 2 % (or one million) per annum. Moreover, with each enlargement, the question continues to resurface: with 20 to 23 members, would it ever be possible to decide anything using the current system of voting? The whole machinery might be deadlocked altogether.

Another question is whether the Commission as a bureaucracy can survive yet another massive entry of new officials and what effects would this have on its efficiency as an institution. This seems to be a legitimate worry, particularly since bargaining among national governments over the allocation of posts has become almost institutionalised and rather crude. The whole Brussels 'Eurocracy' will be subjected to more fierce criticism as its efficiency and ability to cope with the challenges may decline. Observers of the Community scene indicate a gradual emergence of a distinct North-South grouping within the EC policies. The recent two enlargements have shifted the centre of gravity of the Community towards the South. The weight of the Mediterranean countries (including France) in the European Parliament, for instance, increased from 35.9 % to 52.2 %, in the Commission from 29.4 % to 47.1 % and in the Council of Ministers from 32.9 % to 50 %. Although Community practice has so far acted against the formation of long-term blocks, the possibility of future alliances among Mediterranean members of the EC cannot be entirely discounted. Can the Northern countries support a Turkish membership which would disturb further the balance in the Community decision-making machinery? They would naturally prefer to see the accession of those countries, which share similar characteristics with themselves - Scandinavian and Nordic states before Turkey is considered. Perhaps this may lead to the possibility of negotiating a package deal in which all candidates will be considered in the final equation.

One last point worth mentioning is the Turkish language and adaptation to the acquis communautaire. The translation service would be stretched to the limits by the addition of Turkish to the other official languages. The Turkish is relatively less used in Western Europe and it would be practically quite difficult to find a corps of qualified interpreters and translators able to work from Turkish into their mother tongues. Thus, the addition of Turkish would be yet another reason for reorganising the system in Brussels. Following its request of accession, the Turkish government has, in cooperation with the Commission, embarked on a comprehensive programme with a view to adapting to the acquis communautaire. Twenty-four inter-ministerial sub-committees were set up to cover such areas as EC institutions, budget-finance, agriculture, industry, free movement of workers, social policies, competition, transport, EMU, external relations, environment, research and development, etc. Most legislation and constitutional amendments, which will ensure conformity to the EC standards, have already been drawn up, waiting to be enacted by the Parliament. Given the great requirement for qualified staff at every level well versed in EC affairs, a personnel master plan has been put into effect, which will train 21.100 EC experts from 1988 to 1995. The number of civil servants already trained in Turkey or abroad amounts to 5000 persons from November 1987 to June 1991.

h) How Major Community Member States View Turkey's Place in Europe?

Though Greece is known to be the strongest opponent of a Turkish membership in the Community, there are a number of other EC member states with serious reservations on Turkey's possible accession. The widespread belief is that the others are comfortably hiding behind the well-known Greek objections and that an improvement in the Turco-Greek relations may remove the first line of opposition and unmask those countries so far seeking refuge behind Athens' disapproval.

The chief objector at the moment is Germany, which is having so much trouble with right-wing xenophobia that it does not want to contemplate even more Turkish workers in its economy. Germany holds the key to Turkey's membership. All other obstacles including the veto card of Greece can be overcome in time. But the EC shall continue to add new obstacles, as it has done in the past, unless Germany reconsiders its cost-benefit analysis of a Turkish accession. With the arrival in power of a center & social democrat government in Turkey and due to the convergence (or, as some would argue, divergence) of economic, political and security interests in the new architecture of the Balkans, the ex-Soviet Union and the Middle East, some has hoped that the Turco-German 'special' relations could revive and start moving in the right direction once again. Both Kohl and Genscher, after their meeting with the Turkish foreign minister in Bonn early this year, had lent, in a joint declaration, their support to Turkey's quest for membership of the Community. Yet how this political statement will be translated into reality remains to be seen. The latest development in what was once termed the "historic and special relationship" is that Germany suspended supplies of military equipment to Turkey and harshly criticized the government in Ankara for its attacks on 'Kurdish settlements' in the southeast of the country. Mr. Genscher called on the EC to condemn the Turkish actions, which he described as in "total contravention" of the Helsinki Final Act and contrary to its commitment as a member of NATO and the CSCE. German reaction was stoked by alleged evidence that former East German military equipment supplied by Bonn had been used in the raids against Kurdish terrorists, and by a Turkish accusation that Germany was harbouring the separatist PKK terrorists. It is worth noting that this strongly-worded German reaction has been delivered at a crucial time when the new government has, in its first 100 days, launched comprehensive reforms for improvements in human rights, democratic freedoms to satisfy Kurdish aspirations. The German-Turkish relations, always sensitive because of the 1.5 mn Turks who make up Germany's largest population of foreigners, have been especially tense since the Gulf War, when Bonn publicly hesitated before saying it would live up to the commitment to defend its NATO ally in the event of an Iraqi attack. The fact that both countries share a history of active economic, political and strategic cooperation is a complicating factor, raising expectations, but also producing certain wariness on both sides. The perceived tardiness of the German response in contributing to the Allied Mobile Force deployments to Turkey during the Gulf crisis has left a negative impression on Turkish public opinion - an impression that had not been erased by subsequent contributions (indeed, the swiftness of the German assistance to Kurdish refugees in Iran only reinforced the impression that the problem was not the Bonn's constitutional difficulty in committing forces outside the Central Region, but the political reluctance to commit German forces in defence of Turkey). The latest sharp confrontation between two countries came at a time when geopolitical weight of both countries has been much increased by the end of the Cold War: Germany's by unification, Turkey's by the re-opening of its cultural and economic access to the basically Turkish-speaking Central Asian and Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union. They also take a differing look at the new formations in the Balkans. Germany is currently playing a locomotive role in the process of the EC enlargement negotiations with five members of the EFTA - Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland - and three East European countries - Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which will separate into two distinct entities on 1 January 1993, Poland and Hungary - before Turkey is considered. As far as Turkish membership is concerned, Germany is widely seen in the Community circles as the only country that could engineer a favourable response from its other EC partners. In the absence of German (or French) involvement, progress toward full membership seems quite unlikely. The two-day visit last July of the new German foreign minister, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, has contributed to a somewhat relaxed atmosphere between the two countries. "Turkey is an integral part of Europe", Kinkel announced at the end of his visit to Ankara. He added that Bonn supported the Turkish full membership to the EC, but there were issues, like the free movement of Turks, to be worked out. He refrained, however, from giving a possible timetable for full membership. Mr. Kinkel's words in Ankara were seen as more "diplomatic" than his and his aides' statements to the German press in Bonn. For example, he said on his return to Bonn that while Germany supported "enhanced relations" by way of implementing the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and the EC, the prospect of full membership was not likely in the near future.

The Mediterranean countries, whose agricultural and labour-intensive sectors will have to face strong competition from Turkey, reflect mixed feelings. Most Mediterranean countries, along with Ireland, known as the "cohesion countries" are aware that they will have to share the benefits of the EC regional and structural funds with Turkey. Owing to the low figures of Turkish income, Turkey would have valid claims on a very large share of the cohesion funds which the Community distributes, with consequent scaling down of what other countries now receive. This would naturally diminish the availability of the Community funds. The Iberian enlargement has already raised a number of adjustment issues, particularly for the agricultural and semi-industrial regions of the Mediterranean members. The Community was then compelled to introduce what it called the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes in 1985 as an instrument for tackling the structural economic problems of the whole Mediterranean region who had most to fear from the imminent competition of the newly acceding economies. There is no doubt that, should Turkey join the EC, the "cohesion countries" will try to extract a IMP-like compensatory package from the wealthier countries and insist on rather long transitional periods from Turkey on a number of sectors. From a different perspective, Turkey, with its 60 million-strong population and hence vast attractive market, might be regarded as an asset by the "Intra-Community South" to counter-balance the predominance of the "North" led by Germany in the EC.

Britain favours widening the EC, partly to curb the growth of federal power under an EPU and an EMU, and partly to delay the transfer of power from member governments to the Commission in Brussels. London also tends to view the further enlargement of the Community from the perspective of new opening markets, trade and investment opportunities. The British attitude concerning a possible accession of Turkey to the Community, apart from what has been listed above, appears also to have been influenced by geo-strategical considerations - Turkey as an indispensable ally of the Western Alliance in a critical region. Just prior to taking over the six-month term presidency, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, was in Ankara promoting the notion that his country would do all within its power to ensure that relations between Turkey and the EC should be revitalised. Mr Hurd prepared a report on the subject containing a series of recommendations on how to improve relations between Ankara and Brussels. The US, too, sees Turkey's EC membership in its own interest. As a matter of fact, the US Administration had reportedly approached some European capitals in the past (last time during the Bush-Kohl summit at Camp David in March 1992) and advocated the case for Turkey not to be excluded from the Community architecture. Nixon, too, in his memoirs Seize the Moment urges the Community to incorporate Turkey in the EC and the WEU for compelling geo-strategic reasons. Given the well-known European allergy for pressures coming from Washington, this kind of interventions may not serve the purpose and indeed can be counter-productive, highlighting the impression that Turkey may become another Trojan Horse within the EC to enjoy 'special relationship' with the United States.

The French officials are now recognizing the need that Paris should cooperate more with Italy and Spain to promote the Mediterranean interests inside the EC at a time when Germany is geared to fight for the East European and EFTA member countries. France, as the leader of the "Club Med" nations, is seriously concerned that Germany would dominate the EC when the EFTA members and the newly democratic East European states were offered membership. France and its neighbours also worry that enlarging the EC would retard the building of strong federal institutions for at least another decade. But, since the EFTA enlargement seems now inevitable soon after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaties, the French line of thinking may tilt towards seeking strong allies to counterbalance the predominant position in the Community of Germany. In a hypothetical equation, Turkey fits the definition. Some Turks hope that the French will break away from the general European line-up against Turkey's admission. The French have duly noted Turkish signals that any country which supports its application will be favoured in the allocation of attractive defence and other big contracts in the large Turkish market. Some big government contracts are already known to have been awarded to French companies with such an expectation in mind. France is now on the way to become the biggest foreign investor in Turkish economy. At present, there are 110 French companies doing business in Turkey as opposed to only 10 in 1989. Trade exchanges totalled FF 12 bn in 1990. A cultural project is also under way to set up a university, which will use as a medium of instruction the French language. In political relations a great distance has been covered towards full normalization after a period of troubled relationship in the late 1970s and early 80s. Mitterrand's recent visit (13-14 April 1992) to Turkey has ushered in a new era in the Turco-French relations. Before his visit, some Turkish newspapers headlined: "France instead of Germany". Mr. Mitterrand was given a warm welcome in Ankara. It appeared as if France has gained the sympathy of the Turks due to a comparison of his stand on EC and Kurdish issues with that of Germany. As for the Turkish-Community relations, Mr. Mitterrand stated: "La Turquie quie releve de l'espace europeen, si ce n'est au sens geographique exact, du moins dans ses acceptions economiques, culturelles, militaires et politiques. L'Europe se dessine comme une vaste communaute de valeurs et d'interets qui ne saurait etre limitee par des prejuges culturels". President Mitterrand went a step further and declared that it was impossible that France will oppose Turkey's full EC membership in political terms, but cited some economic factors including the free movement of labour as a major problem which needs to be sorted out before the realisation of membership. He also said that after the 1992 Single Market, the Turkish application would be considered along with other EFTA membership hopefuls.

Italy, Spain and Portugal are unlikely to table strong opposition to Turkey's joining the Club if France and Germany give their blessing, although their economies will face strong competition from Turkish textile and agriculture. Obviously, to enlist the support of these countries, Turkey should be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive give-and-take package deal with them.

Having said all these, what is expected of Turkey is to devise a membership strategy addressing convincingly the sensitivities of major Community countries and commence a high level shuttle diplomacy carefully targeted at each individual EC capital in putting forth its case for full membership. An all-out publicity campaign, backed up by a series of meaningful political and economic reforms, aimed at winning the support of, not only the EC governments, but also of the European public, will be helpful to get the key message across that Turkey, if acceded into the Community, is not going to be an economic and political liability, but is a modern, secular, economically fast growing, culturally rich country, which will contribute its own share to the Community.

V. FUTURE PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS
(To be continued 30 Mart/March 1998)

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